THE HINDU THEORIES OF ILLUSION
BY RASVIHARY DAS

AMONG

many

the

Hindus

contributions of the

to

Logic and

Epistemology, their discussions on the problem of iUusion have

They are hkely

got an importance of their own.
interest at the present time

when

to be of particular

epistemological problems connected

with sense perception are receiving great attention from man\- contemporary thinkers. We propose therefore to give in this paper a
survey of the principal theories of illusion that are met with

critical

in the standard philosophical writings of the
incidentall}' point out at the

phenomenon of

We

Hindus.

shall also

end the inexplicable character of the

illusion.

is propounded about illusion, the fact of illuBut what is an illusion? An
for
granted.
taken
must
be
sion
which
the object perceived is not
perception
in
of
illusion is a case

Before any theory

found

to be there.

The

illusory character of a perception

realised at the time of perception.

ception

is

only

we

designate

as an illusion.

it

deceived

is

So long as

it

was

there,

it

was taken
The claim

in

to

an essential aspect of illusion. So long as we are not
an appearance, we have really no illusion. Anyway the

b}'

important thing about an illusion

Some other
what we take it to

is

that the object as perceived

should not be there.

object

But that is not
no illusion. It

be.

is

determined as an
ception,

not

have been wrong, and

realise the first perception to

seriousness to be a case of valid perception.

validity

is

act of per-

sublated by another perception, directed towards the same

object, that

all

It is

when one

whether

same order.

A

may

indeed be in

its

place.

Mei'ely in perceiving there

is

only by an objective reference that a perception

is

As

illusion.

right or

a psychological fact an act of per-

wrong,

perception

is

is

as real as

known

as

an

any other fact of the

illusion

when

the per-
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mistaken identity with the object

before the perceiver.

Now

is certainly some object before the perciand it must be in some form of contact with the apSo the object, which is
propriate sense organ of the perceiver.

in iUusion there

pient subject,

there,

may

What can be or is
always the object before the perceiver. But the

be said, in a sense, to be perceived.

ever perceived

is

mental content

in the case of illusion is not of the

nature as the object.

They are

same form and
and illusion consists
the non-apprehension

really distinct,

in not taking note of this distinction.

This

is

theory (akhyativada) of illusion advocated by the Mimamsakas.
In order to understand the full significance of this theor\-,

we

must refer here to the !Mimamsaka doctrine of the self-validity
According to the
of all knowledge.
( svatahpramanyavada
]\Iimamsakas, the validity of an act of knowledge is not derived
from anything outside the knowledge but is inherent in it. \Mienever there is any knowledge, the validity of the knowledge is given
along" with the knowledge.
If knowledge as such were not valid, it
would be very difficult to determine its validity by any other means.
It may be supposed that the validity of an act of knowledge can be
determined b\' another act of knowledge. But an act of knowledge
)

can

determine the validity of another only when the de-

reall}'

termining knowledge
the validity of this

is itself

valid,

knowledge?

and how

If for its

ferred to a third act of knowledge,

we be assured of
we are to be reknow' how the re-

shall

validity

we do

not

sulting regressus ad infinitum can ever be stopped.

One may suppose
absence of defect

that the validity of a

in the

knowledge

is

due

to the

instrument of knowledge or to the posses-

form that is ascribed to it by knowlknowledge is not valid when there
is some defect in the instrument of knowledge and the object does
not possess the form that is ascribed to it by knowledge. But it is
easy to see that the true form of the object and the absence of
defect in the instrument of knowledge must be known in order that
sion by the object of the exact

edge

;

because

may
we know
they

we

find that our

be used as criteria of valid knowledge.

It is

only

when

is no defect in the instrument of knowledge
pronounce a particular knowledge to be valid. But howare we to know that our knowledge of the absence of defect in the
instrument of knowledge is itself valid? Unless this is valid, it

that there

that w^e can
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So we have to suppose either
knowledge of the absence of defect in the instrument of
knowledge is valid by itself or that we have to go beyond this knowlcannot validate another knowledge.

that our

edge in order to secure

its

we

validity. If

we

accept the latter alternative,

on to a regressus ad inSo we have to accept the former alternative and admit that
knowledge does not owe its validity to an}thing else. If we do not
accept this position, the Alimamsakas say, all our knowledge will be
it

is

again easy to see that

shall be led

finitum.

infected with doubt, and universal scepticism will be the inevitable

consequence.

But
It is

knowledge as such

if all

evident that

theory,

we must

associated with
of knowledge,

we

if

give

what then

valid,

a character different

it

valid knowledge,

is

it

from what

should recognise that

So

could not but be valid.

it

is

an illusion?

are to explain illusion in the light of this

We

it.

is

if
if

illusion

generally
a case

not a case of

is

it

is

were

no knowledge at all. An illusion, then, is a
But this negation of knowledge,

case of no-knowledge (akhyati).

which characterises
not a fact that
edge.

If

it

we

were

illusion,

should not be taken absolutely.

so,

instance of illusion.

surely known, and in
But there is also some

so far as there
fact

which

is

is

is

is

knowledge,

it

is

all

valid.

not taken note of and this non-

cognisance constitutes the real essence of
of white shell

It

where there is absolutely no knowlour dreamless sleep would have been the best
But this is not so. In illusion something is

get illusion

mistaken for a piece of

illusion.
silver,

When

a piece

what happens

is

that although the object before the perceiver, merely as presented

something,

is

perceived to be there,

its

specific character

is

not grasped

on account of some defect in the conditions of perception, either
insufficiency of light or some defect in the eye or something else.
The shining appearance of the piece of shell, which is very similar
to the appearance of silver, revives in our mind certain impressions
which are associated with silver, and in consequence we come to
have a remembrance of silver. The content silver can scarcely be
called a perceived content, since there

perception.

So

silver

content revived in the

of perception

is

is

is

no

silver in the field of

not the object of perception but a mental

mind by means of memory.

The

real object

the piece of white shell present before the percipient

But in illusion we fail to take note of the distinction besubject.
tween what is presented and what is only revived in the mind by
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this distinction defines the char-

acter of illusion.

But how does the shining appearance of a piece of
in us the

memory

shell

produce

of silver rather than that of other pieces of shell

which we have seen before, seeing that the appearance of a piece of
is similar not only to that of silver but also to the appearance of
other pieces of shell as well ? In order to understand why we remember silver and not any piece of shell, which we may have seen
before, we must realise that our interest plays a great part in all
facts of our conscious life.
We are more interested in silver, beshell

cause of

its

superior value for us, than in pieces of shell and this

interest accounts for
Still

memory

there

is

there

is

our ready remembrance of

some

difficulty

in

this

silver.

In

position.

a reference to past experience

which

all

acts of

is

signified

by our speaking of the remembered object as "that" and not as
"this."
In illusion, however, we say "this is silver" and we do not
speak or think of the silver as that silver, which should have been
the case if the silver in question were an object of memor}-.
This difficulty can be solved by supposing that the reference to
;

past or "thatness" in the

remembered

because of some mental defect,
thatness

is

it

silver

is

overlooked bv us

our greed for wealth.

[Moreover

not an essential aspect of an object of memory.

for instance

ognise

i.e.

we remember

the

W'hen
meaning of a word, we do not rec-

as "that" meaning.

But when in illusion we say "this is silver," we use "this" as the
subject and "silver" as the predicate of one and the same proposition.
We imply thereby that "thisness" and "silverhood" occupy
the same locus (samanadhikarana ).
And thinking in all serious-

we go forward to pick it up. This seems to
go against the implications of this theory which supposes that the
ness "this" to be silver,

only remembered.

The

remembered occupies
and in order to obtain it we
should not move towards a place where it is not.
To meet this objection we have to remember that in illusion we
have two distinct acts of knowledge and that they differ in their
character as well as in their object. The one is perception and the
other is memory. The object of the one is "this" and that of the
other "silver."
But as the difference between these two distinct
acts of knowledge does not appear to us for the time being, we treat
silver

is

silver that is

a different place in time and space
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them both as
same locus.

When we
some form.
acter of this

identical

(in illusion)

and refer

their objects to the

illusion of silver, silver is no doubt known in
The important question to decide is about the charknowledge. When we can find out what the real object

have an

of this knowledge

The ]\Iimamsakas

is,

we can

find out

what

its

real character

is.

believe, with their notion of the self-validity of

knowledge, that the object of any act of knowledge can only be

which appears in it. If the object of knowledge could be
different from what appears in it, we would not have faith in any
knowledge, and would thus involve ourselves in utter scepticism.
So the real object of a knowledge of silver, even in illusion, can
But if this is so^ then what is the nature of
only be real silver.
that

knowledge ?
memory. There
that

It

may

be either perception or inference or

no fourth alternative. As there is no silver
before the perceiver, we cannot suppose that there is any preception

A

of silver.
in question

The

is

is

perception of a thing
in direct contact

is

possible only

object being not present in the case of illusion,

pose that

it is

really perceived.

edge of silver

in

illusion

is

It

may

somehow appears

fects in the conditions of perception.

it

and

is

we cannot

sup-

be supposed that our knowl-

which

is

as silver,

But

present before the

owing

to

some

de-

this supposition implies

from what appears

that the object of a perception can be different
in

the thing

really perception, the real object of

the perception being the piece of shell

perceiver and which

when

(sannikarsha) with our sense organs.

therefore open to the objection that

it

will lead to uni-

would be strange if the
content of a perception were to be referred to an object which is
We conclude therefore that our knowlutterly different from it.

versal scepticism as pointed out above.

edge of silver in illusion
It

is

is

also not inference.

It

not perception.

An

inference

the knowledge of a middle term (linga)

is

and

always mediated by
in illusion

we do

not

any knowledge of a middle term.
Therefore we seem forced to the conclusion that our knowledge
of silver in illusion is of the nature of remembrance. The object of
this knowledge, which is real silver and is not present before us, is
find

our consciousness by an act of memory.
The Mimamsakas maintain that it is on this theory that we can
satisfactorily explain the subsequent knowledge (on the cessation

brought

to
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that

)

it

is

On

not silver.
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any other theory we have to

suppose that our knowledge, that the thing before us

knowledge that

not silver,

is

was

But
knowledge being equally valid, there cannot be any real contraOn the Alimamsaka
diction between one knowledge and another.
theory there is no contradiction between the two acts of knowledge.
In the former knowledge we failed to take note of the difference
between the perceived "this" and the remembered "silver," whereas
is

a contradiction of the previous

it

silver.

all

we only come to recognise this difference.
The above will give us some idea of the Mimamsaka theory of

in the latter

non-apprehension of distinction.

illusion as

show

will

that

it

is

open

JJut a little reflection

to several criticisms.

It is

maintained by

this theory that both the presented object (this) and the remem-

bered content (silver) are known and onl}- their difference is not
known. But we fail to understand how two things can appear in
knowledge without making at the same time their distinction from
When two things are cognised, we
one another apprehended.
naturally expect that the difference between them will also be
cognised.
It
if,

has been said that

that

is,

our knowledge

if

the real object

is

lose all faith in knowledge.

by

reach

its

This

difficulty

object,

we

shall

can hardly be met even

For when we get a knowledge of the form "this is
we cannot be sure whether the table in this act of knowl-

this theory.

a table,"

edge
is,

fails to

not given in our knowledge,

is

only a remembered table or a perceived one, whether, that

the table

is

or

is

not present before us.

^Moreover when we judge "this is silver," what is given in our
knowledge is not "this" and "silver" but "this-silver," a complex
unit}- which is analysed in our judgment as "this" and "silver."
It
is grasped by a single act of mind and it does not seem to be a correct reading of facts to suppose that in this one act of knowledge
we have a mixture of both perception and memory.
]\Iere

conduct

non-apprehension of distinction cannot explain our specific
in

any case of

knowledge.
activity

(e.g.

It

is

Xon-apprehension

illusion.

absurd

to

suppose that

running away from an

lack of knowledge.

It

thing with another that

is

we

can be

illusor}-

is

absence of

moved

snake)

to any
from mere

rather in the false identification of one

we must

So the Naivavikas hold

look for the essence of illusion.

that

when

in

illusion

we

sav "this

is
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silver" there

an attribution of silverhood

is

to the presented object.

There is no doubt about the fact that in an illusion of silver there
The only question is whether there is
is an appearance of silver.
real silver or

We

ance.

something

else or

nothing at

cannot suppose that there

is

all

behind the appear-

nothing at

behind the

all

appearance, because a mere nothing can never put up an appearcannot also suppose that there is real silver before us
ance.

We

which appears as silver in illusion, because in that case the appearance would not disappear with the cessation of illusion. We have
therefore to suppose that there is something else, namely a piece of
white shell, which appears as silver, because our subsequent percepWe must
tion is that it is not silver but a piece of white shell.
therefore believe, so the Naiyayikas say, that in illusion a thing ap-

pears different from what

anyathakhyativada,

the

it

actually

theory

This theory

is.

of

different

Naivayikas do not believe in the validity of
opinion a knowledge

is

valid only

when

all

is

known

knowledge.

the object of

as

The

appearance.

In their

knowledge pos-

In illusion the object of
sesses the form that is ascribed to it.
knowledge (a piece of white shell) has not the form (silverhood)
Therefore it is not valid. If knowledge as
that is ascribed to it.
such were always valid, there w^ould be no room, they say, of any
doubt. Since we have real doubts about the validity of some cogniThe
tions, w^e cannot think that knowledge as such is always valid.
Naiyavikas will admit with the Mimamsakas that whenever there
is illusion, there is some defect in the conditions of perception and
we fail to perceive the thing before us clearly. But the illusory

character of a knowledge consists not in our failure to perceive
clearly, but in the actual appearance (khyati) of one thing as another or different (anyatha) from what

it

actually

is.

Although it is generally true that a thing appears as it is, we
are forced, by the subsequent cancellation of our illusory knowledge
to admit that in illusion a thing can and does appear different from

what

it

actually

is.

This theory maintains that there

is

some

real

an illusory appearance, and that an illusory object also has
real existence, although not at the place where it is seen in illusion.
Unless there were real silver, which we had seen before, it would not
basis of

be possible for us to have an illusion of silver.
There are thus three points to be specially noted in
of illusion:

first,

this

theory

the appearance of something other than the object
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before the perceiver; secondly, the existence of a real basis of the

appearance, and

thirdl\-,

Let us

the existence of the illusory object.

consider these points one by one.

According to this theor}-, an illusion is the appearance of an
Does the thing behind the
15ut wherein lies the otherness ?
appearance become itself an other and put up the appearance ? or
A thing cannot of
is there otherness only in the appearance?
other.

course have the attribute of otherness to

itself.

can become an

It

other onl\- in the sense of being transformed into a different thing

by an actual process of change. If it does so and then presents
itself, we shall no longer call the appearance an illusion, and it will
not be cancelled b}' an}' subsequent knowledge. We have therefore
to suppose that the otherness in question lies merely in the appearance.

otherness of the appearance?

r>ut w^hat constitutes the

The

otherness of the appearance can be constituted only by the fact that
the

form of the appearance

something different, that
"appearance of silver"

that of silver

is

whereas

a piece of white shell.

is,

in this

basis

its

By

is

the term

connexion we mean the knowledge of

we get in an illusion
otherness we can only mean

of silver; and

silver that

when we speak

of

knowledge of silver has
its
for its basis something which is diiferent from silver.
But we can
refer to a thing as the basis of some knowledge only when the form
of the thing appears in that knowledge. When a piece of shell does
that our

not appear in a knowledge, in what sense can it be the basis of that
knowledge ? This leads us to the second point.
Our knowledge of silver in illusion has a real basis or an
unreal one. If it had a real basis, it should not be contradicted at
all.
But the fact that it is contradicted shows that it has no real
basis.
So it can have only an unreal basis. But an unreal basis is
no basis at all. To say that our knowledge of silver in illusion has
no basis at all is to say that there can be an appearance which need
not have any basis.
It

may

be said that there

our knowledge of

But although

silver,

even

silver as silver

is

real silver in the world,

in illusion,

may

exist

is

somewhere

shop of a silver-smith, silver as appearing

form of a presented object
real existence.
is

When

in

else, e.g. in

illusion,

i.e.

at a particular point of space,

in illusion

silver," the basis of this

and hence

not absolutel}- baseless.

our knowledge

knowledge can be

is

in

the
the

has no

of the form "this

either "this as identi-
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fied as

one with silver" or merely "this" or merely "silver." "This"

(the object before the perceiver) as silver does not exist, for the

object before the perceiver

is

only a piece of shell and not

But

only "this" or only "silver" can be the basis.

silver.

So

in either case

our

knowledge would not be of the form "this is silver," but would be
It is difficult to
either of the form "this" or of the form "silver."
maintain therefore that there is any real basis for an illusory appearance.

now

Let us

consider whether an illusion

When

existence of the illusory object.
rected,

we

certainly say "this

is

our

not silver"

ence of the silver that appeared in

illusion.

anyway

implies the

illusion of silver

exists

it

somewhere

from the occurrence of

cor-

and thus deny the existReal silver might have

been experienced before, from which we got the idea of

whether

is

but

silver,

even now, we cannot say either

else

from

illusion or

its

correction.

tended that in the correcting cognition silver

itself

It

is

con-

not denied,

is

no silver"), but only its identity with the
Bvit if merely the negation of the
identity of two things were the meaning of the correcting cogniThat, however, is not
tion, both the things would be given in it.

(we do not say "there

is

object before the perceiver.

the case.

These
that

it

is

difficulties

have persuaded the

idealist

Buddhists to hold

needless to assume the existence of external things.

In

illusion,

as everybody admits, we have direct knowledge of a thing

which

not there before us.

fore

is

or an idea.

seen in illusion, can there-

This theory

— the theory of the self-presentation of

What

is in

as an external object

appearance.

silver,

form of knowledge.

be only a

atmakhyativada,

The

What

sometimes comes

is

reality a

mere idea comes

and therein
really there

to us in the

lies
is

form

is

a

known

as

knowledge

to present itself

the illusory character of an

only a flow of knowledge which
of silver

and sometimes

in that

of a piece of shell.

This view does not seem to be quite plausible.

If the silver in

the illusory cognition

were a mere

idea,

a presented object.

^loreover

view does not supply us with
If the flow of knowledge alone

this

it

would not come

to us as

any criterion of truth and error.
were responsible for everything we see or hear, then there would be
no ground for making any distinction between valid and invalid
knowledge.
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of illusion in a different

from the point of view
from the objective point of view, the presentation
of the unreal (asatkhyati). When on the correction of illusion we
say "this is not silver," we mean that the object before us was never
silver.
So in illusion we have the appearance of a thing which is
way.

of knowledge,

is,

This theory

not there.

is

therefore called asat-khyativada or the

theory of the presentation of the unreal.
is

),

If

it is

objected that what

unreal cannot have an appearance, the Buddhists will readily

reply that the appearance and the non-appearance of things are not

dependent upon the nature of objects but they are regulated by
avidya or elemental ignorance.

But the problem is not solved how an unreal entity can ever
become the object of our perception. The silver that we see in illusion cannot be absolutely unreal. Because if it were absolutely unXor can it be real, for in
real, we would not have seen it at all.
So
that case it would not be negated in the correcting cognition.
the silver of illusion belongs to a category of being which is neither
This

nor unreal.

real

is

anirvachaniya-khyativada of the \ edantins

(of the Sankara school), the theory of the presentation of the indescribable.

This theory seems to be necessitated by the insufficiency of asat-

khyativada which supposes the illusory object to be absolutely unreal.

But

it is

doubtful whether this theory

any the clearer by
is

its

itself

makes

the matter

indescribable in the sense of being neither real nor unreal

;

is

really

Real and unreal are generally taken to be mutually

unthinkable.
exclusive

What

peculiar notion of the indescribable.

we cannot

think of a middle region which

is

neither real

We

do not understand how the indescribable appears
and disappears and are not provided with any means of finding out
whether the object of any of our perceptions is or is not of the
nor unreal.

nature of the indescribable, so long as
the field of perception, yielding

According
is

to the

its

Vedantins of

it

does not disappear from

place to a

new

object.

this school, the propositions "this

and "this is not silver" (on the cessation of
have got predicates of different significance. In the first

silver" (in illusion)

illusion)

proposition silver stands for indescribable silver, and in the second
it

stands for ordinary silver such as can be had in the market.

being the case, there

is

no

real

Such

contradiction between these two
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propositions and so the truth of one proposition cannot be taken as
In
the ground on which the falsity of the other can be asserted.
fact
"this

accept this theory, w^e cannot say that the proposition
on illusion is really false, because some sort

we

if
is

silver" based

of silver, even though

it

may

be of the indescribable kind,

to be there at the place of illusion,

pected by the perceiver

is

and what

is

granted

sort of silver

is

not specified in the proposition

ex-

itself.

we are passing these theories in a critical review, it is
that every one of them has got something relevant
recognise
w^ell to
some aspect or other of the phenomenon of illuregarding
to sav
A\'hile

We

judgments of perception are not wholly
determined by what actually comes from without. Our past experience, present interests and other accompanying circumstances
And it is
are responsible for much that we seem to see or hear.
between
what is
true that in illusion w^e are not able to distinguish
given outside and what is simply mental. These points are emphasion.

know

that our

The theory
sised by the theory of non-apprehension (akhyati).
of different appearance (anyatha-khyati) gives us exactly the ordinary view of illusion that it is the appearance of one thing as anBut ontologically the thing seen in illusion is not certainly
So it is an appearance of the unreal (asat-kh}'ati).
Hence it is plausible also to suppose that what we see to be there in
But if it is
illusion is really an idea of the mind (atma-khyati).

other.

there in reality.

an idea of the mind, how
the illusory object

is

is it

seen as an external object?

how

w^iolly unreal,

is

it

And

if

These

seen at all?

have been brought out by the theory of indescribable
appearance (anirvachaniya-khyati ). But if these constitute a real
difficulties

difficulty,
it is

it

is

When

such as can admit of no further explanation.

said that a particular

phenomenon

is

an

illusion,

we must admit

we have understood all that requires to be understood
we have something which from the nature of the
case is inexplicable. An illusion may be supposed to be explained
completely when the nature of the illusory object is explained.

either that

in the case or that

There

is

nothing to be explained

explained psychological event.

But

in
it

mere
is

seeing.

object that raises the whole crop of difficulties.
is

either a mere nothing or something.

real or unreal.

If

it

is

real then

These alternatives appear

to

it

is

If

It

is

a

self-

the nature of the illusory

it is

The

illusory object

something,

it is

either

either psychical or physical.

be exhaustive and w^e find that none
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of them
object

The

illusory

explicable in the case of the

illusor_\-

object.

not a mere nothing which by

itself is

not a possible object

is

is

231

of thought or perception.

It is

surely something, but a something

which cannot be said to be either real or unreal.
it would be a mere nothing and would not be seen

were unreal,
If it were

If

it

at

all.

]!ut if it were psywould not have an external appearance, and if it were
So it is neither psychical nor
physical it would not disappear.
physical, and we cannot conceive of a third variety. Hence we canreal,

it

chical,

w^ould be either psychical or physical.

it

not say that

it

is

real at

the world of reality,
in realit}'

We

have

all.

we can

which can serve as
to take

it

When we
easily
its

edge

is

ground and supply

it

has received

a

not there.

is

recognised to be an illusion,

is

nothing

its

is

it

explanation.

When

make

its

we

a knowl-

characterisation
to

in

nothing

we must acknowledge

final

which nothing further can be said about
intelligible to us.

it

simply as a fact of experience that in illusion

have the appearance of a thing which
epistemologically

realise that

understand that there

that

beyond

nature more

